War Powers Resolution: Syria

Latest in War Powers Resolution: Syria

ISIS

Obama Administration Explains Why It Thinks Islamic State Strikes Comply With War Powers Resolution

Last week I explained that a likely major reason for the Obama administration’s switch from an Article II rationale for air strikes against the Islamic State to an AUMF rationale (2001 and 2002) was compliance with the War Power s Resolution (WPR).  Section 5(b) of the WPR requires the President to “terminate any use of United States Armed Forces” 60 days after he introduces such forces into “hostilities” unless Congress “has enacted a specific authorization for such u

ISIS

The Administration Has Violated the War Powers Resolution Unless It is Right About the Applicability of the AUMFs to the Islamic State

On Monday, Senator Cruz maintained that the War Powers Resolution (WPR) clock had expired because 60 days had passed since the first air strikes against the Islamic State, which the President notified Congress about in a letter to Congress on August 8.  “Given that 60 days has expired,” the Senator argued, “the presi

AUMF: Scope and Reach

The Administration Should Explain Its International Legal Basis to Attack ISIL in Syria

Over the last several days, Administration officials have tried valiantly to explain the Administration’s surprising 11th hour discovery that the 2001 AUMF and indeed the 2002 AUMF provide a domestic law basis for the U.S. use of force in Iraq and Syria.

War Powers Resolution: Syria

Further Reflections on the Legal Rationale For Using Force Against the Islamic State

I had a pretty harsh reaction to the administration’s claim that Congress in the 2001 AUMF authorized force against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.  (For a different view, see Marty Lederman’s post.)  While I think the administration’s interpretation of the 2001 AUMF is unconvincing, I do not believe (as Bruce Ackerman appears to say today

War Powers Resolution: Syria

The 2001 AUMF Covers 2014 Counterterrorism Operations Against ISIS?

What Ben said.

I certainly can see why the executive branch would want to adopt a reading as aggressive as this one: it nips some War Powers Resolution questions in the bud, and helps to make it more likely that, going forward, talk of any additional congressional authorization can be held in best practices terms rather than legal ones.

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