In the face of a different type of terrorist threat, the United States must focus on strategies that have worked.
Latest in Counterterrorism
September was a relatively quiet month for international terrorism arrests and prosecutions, with nearly all the action occurring in New York City.
The FBI arrested and charged eight men with attempting or conspiring to provide material support to Islamic State; Hezbollah operatives were arrested for planning attacks within U.S. borders; and the Justice Department brought the first foreigner to the U.S. to face terrorism charges since Trump became president.
In a scathing New York Times op-ed today, Micah Zenko lays into the Trump administration both for maintaining the “counterproductive” and “immoral” counterterrorism policies of its predecessors (particularly those involving the use of military force), and for makin
Al Qaeda’s power and influence have fallen considerably from its peak in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. The question is whether the group remains strong and may resurge, or whether the decline is for real and may even be permanent.
Why didn’t the United States invade Afghanistan and destroy al Qaeda before September 11, 2001? This isn’t as farfetched as it might sound.
The President should should consolidate the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and the National Targeting Center (NTC), which would reduce the chance of error, expedite redress procedures, and save money.
This week's arrest of two Hezbollah/IJO agents might best be understood as one small part of a larger, complex policy framework that usually is glimpsed only through the lens of its diplomatic aspects.
Although many have noted Prime Minister Theresa May’s advocacy of a re-examination of British counterterrorism efforts in the wake of the London attacks, few have considered closely what such changes might look like—and how they may or may not involve this side of the Atlantic.
In light of press reports that President Trump may have revealed sensitive counterterrorism information originating from the Israeli government to Russian officials, it’s useful to take a step back and run through what foreign liaison relationships do and why they are important to U.S. counterterrorism.