Our electoral infrastructure consists of two distinct pieces (or so it seems to me): a broader public context in which elections occur and a narrower system of election management. To date, almost everything we know about Russian electoral interference has dealt with the larger broader context—fake news, Russian troll factories, the hack of the DNC and other efforts to spread disinformation. As
Latest in Election security
Open-source systems are only one step towards guarding our votes against manipulation—and the hypothesis that using open source software will by itself improve security is questionable at best.
We have entered a world not of factual anarchy but of factual oligarchy—a picture in which the ultimate seat of power is simultaneously least accountable and most protected when it comes to the demands of proof and verifiability.
We should audit the vote not for partisan reasons but because in cybersecurity matters, when there is any indication of a problem, an audit is the responsible and proper course.
A compendium of all Lawfare's election coverage.
We have written a new paper on threats to American elections, considering operations that try to influence voters and threats to voting infrastructure itself.
Recent news reports regarding Russian hacks affecting the November election suggest that the United States is preparing on possible U.S. cyber actions in response, such as revealing information to the Russian public about Putin’s financial holdings that would be embarrassing for him. Without comment on whether this would be a wise policy move, it’s necessary to point out that such an action would not be a “cyber response” in any meaningful sense of the term.
Lawfare is pleased to announce the publication of a new working paper in the Lawfare Research Paper Series: Presidential Elections: A Perilous Time for U.S. Intelligence, by Eric Manpearl.