The U.S. needs to start thinking about how to respond to domestic surveillance in other countries.
Ashley Deeks is a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School. She joined the Virginia faculty in 2012 after two years as an academic fellow at Columbia Law School. She served for ten years in the Legal Adviser's Office at the State Department, most recently as the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs. In 2007-08 she held an International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. After graduating from the University of Chicago Law School, she clerked for Judge Edward Becker on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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A review of anti-propaganda strategies from the Cold War may inform contemporary responses to Russian active measures.
Editor's note: This piece is the second installment in a mutli-blog series building on the Fifth Annual Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict, as explained in detail here.
AJIL Unbound is publishing an online symposium on sovereignty and cyber operations.
A preview of Ashley Deeks's forthcoming paper on secret international agreements and the U.N. Charter.
In the wake of a recent failure to reach international consensus on the application of international law to cyber activities, the United States should seek to shape norms unilaterally by continuing to assertively investigate and indict individuals—including state actors—who engage in cyber activities that the U.S. Government ultimately would like to see the international community characterize as wrongful.